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I. Introduction
The foreign exchange market is a mammoth trading industry
which significantly affects the international economy. Each day, banks,
institutional investors, speculators, and the general public trade tril-
lions of dollars in currency.' These transactions, either by exchange of
currency or trading in "derivatives," 2 help determine foreign exchange
rates and shape the world economy. In the United States, government
officials have scrutinized the regulation of foreign currency trading
and the derivative market's effect on the nation's economy.3
I Accurate data on the aggregate daily exchange of foreign currency is unavailable.
Estimates range from many billions to many trillions of dollars. One part of this market is
the NewYork Clearing House Interbank Payments System. InJuly 1993, an average of $1.087
trillion in dollar-based transactions moved through the system each day. Jay Mathews, Putting
Currency Trading on Tria, WASH. PoSr, Aug. 22, 1993, at HI.
2 A "derivative" is any financial product sold on the basis of an underlying "spot asset."
For example, if a trader purchases an option to buy foreign currency, the market has "de-
rived" and made available the option based on the underlying spot asset - the currency. See
ALAN L. TUCKER, FINANCIAL FUrUREs, OI'rONS, AND SWAPS 1 (1991).
3 See generally Mathews, supra note 1. Representative Gonzalez (D-Tex.) has scrutinized
the actions of individual traders, expressing concern about the lack of regulation of the mas-
sive foreign currency market. Gonzalez has also questioned whether an individual trader
could significantly affect the foreign currency market. Id.
George Soros provides the most prominent example of how individual traders affect the
foreign exchange market. In the summer of 1993, the European Rate Mechanism (ERM)
experienced difficulties in reconciling member nation's currencies. When Soros abandoned
an earlier promise to abstain from trading in the French franc, $9 billion in investment funds
were unleashed on the franc. Although the trading by Soros did not doom the ERM, his
entrance into the market stirred speculation on the currency. See Financier Soros Adds to Pres-
sure on European Exchange Rate System, L.A. TIMEs, July 31, 1993, at DI.
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Currency futures4 and options5 in the United States are subject to
federal law under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA),6 and the fu-
ture and options markets are regulated by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC). The CEA establishes a "contract-market
monopoly" on all commodity futures and options by requiring these
contracts to be traded on an organized exchange (a "contract mar-
ket") which has been authorized by the CFTC.7 Transactions not con-
ducted on an approved market are prohibited." Because foreign
currency is defined as a commodity under the Act,9 all futures and
options in foreign currency must be conducted on a contract market.
Banks and institutions are exempt from the CEA.10 The "Treasury
Amendment"" exempts transactions in foreign currency when the
transactions are conducted over the counter.1 2 According to the legis-
lative history of the CEA, the Treasury Amendment exempts the "in-
terbank market," an informal network of institutions and their dealers
which conduct their own trading in foreign currencies.13 Because
bank regulators monitor the activity of these institutions, CFTC over-
sight is unnecessary. Participants in the interbank market may trade
options and futures over the counter, unrestricted by the contract-mar-
ket monopoly.
4 A "future" is a formalized "forward contract." A forward contract is formed when
parties agree on a present price for the future delivery of the spot asset. See TUCKER, supra
note 2, at 4-5. For example, a farmer forms a contract with a supplier to sell a bushel of
wheat at a negotiated price, delivery to be taken in three months.
Futures are identical to forward contracts, except that the prices and terms of the agree-
ments are standardized. This standardization increases the liquidity of the contracts and
improves the pricing function of the market.
5 An "option" is a contract between two parties which gives the purchaser the right, but
not the obligation, to purchase the spot asset at a later date. Id. at 5. For example, a person
who wishes to buy a house but fears fluctuating market conditions could lock the seller in to
a fixed price by paying, for example, $1,000 to the seller to hold his offer open for one
month. This basic scheme of trading is applied to a myriad of spot assets, including foreign
currency, where the cost of the option is cheaper than the risk of market conditions.
6 See7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The CEA originated in the 1920s as an
attempt to curb speculation prevalent in the commodities futures industry. In order to limit
commodity futures trading to markets which the government could regulate, the CEA cre-
ated the "contract-market monopoly." See infra notes 96-102, 114-16 and accompanying text.
7 7 U.S.C. §§ 2a, 6(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
8 Id.
9 7 U.S.C. § la(3) (Supp. IV 1992). The definition entails "all services, rights, and
interests," which includes foreign currency. See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
10 7 U.S.C. § 2(ii) (Supp. IV 1992).
11 Section 2(ii) has been termed the "Treasury Amendment" because the Department
of Treasury wrote the language adopted by Congress. See infra note 141 and accompanying
text.
12 7 U.S.C. § 2(ii) (Supp. IV 1992). Although this section allows over-the-counter trad-
ing without regulation, any transaction conducted on an approved contract market must
comply with CFTC rules. An over-the-counter trade is a transaction which is conducted off
an organized exchange. See JOHN F. MARSHALL, FuTuRES AND OPrONS CONTRA CrING 5-6
(1989).
13 SeeS. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 49-51 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5843, 5887-89 [hereinafter Treasury Letter].
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Recently, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed foreign
currency trading regulation under the CEA and the Treasury Amend-
ment. In Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber,14 a large trading company sued
an individual trader for breach of contract concerning sixty-eight for-
eign currency futures and options. Tauber, the individual trader,
claimed that his trades with Salomon were illegal. Because Tauber, an
individual, traded futures and options over the counter, the contracts
violated the contract-market monopoly and were unenforceable due to
illegality. The court of appeals disagreed, holding Tauber liable for his
trading debt.15 Most significantly, the court held that the Treasury
Amendment included "sophisticated traders" as part of the interbank
market. Individuals who participate in the interbank market, if sophis-
ticated, are exempt from the CEA.16
This Note will examine Tauber's effect on commodities regulation
and trading in foreign currency. In Part II, the Note explains the back-
ground law, specifically the history and scope of the CEA and the
Treasury Amendment. Part III explains fundamental economic con-
cepts underlying the importance of the case. Part IV explores the intri-
cacies of the case and the court's holding. In Part V, the Note
compares Tauber to established law and examines the potential effects
of the ruling. Finally, this Note concludes that Tauber presents a novel
but potentially disruptive approach to commodities futures regulation
because the holding permits a class of sophisticated traders, who are
subject to no federal oversight, to trade over the counter.
II. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
Lazlo N. Tauber is a doctor, a real estate investor, and an active
participant in foreign currency exchange. 17 He owns a trading com-
pany which specializes in foreign currency transactions, and his net
worth is estimated at $500 million.' 8
Tauber began trading foreign currency in 1981. Individually and
through his trading company,' 9 Tauber exchanged billions of dollars
in currency with at least fourteen trading companies. 20 Among these
was Salomon Forex, Inc., a large foreign exchange company with of-
14 8 F.3d 966 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3575 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1994) (No. 93-
1314) [hereinafter Tauber II].
15 Id. at 979-80.
16 Id. at 977-78.
17 Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 795 F. Supp. 768, 769 (E.D. Va. 1993), affid, Salomon
Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3575 (U.S. Apr. 18,
1994) (No. 93-1314) [hereinafter Tauber I].
18 Id. at 769-70.
19 Tauber owns 75% of Westwood Options, Inc. This company holds a seat on the
Philadelphia Stock Exchange, the nation's largest foreign currency exchange. Id. at 770.
20 Id.
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fices worldwide. 21 Tauber traded billions of dollars worth of currency
with Salomon between 1987 and 1991.22 Tauber and Salomon traded
mainly in foreign currency futures and options, and these trades were
primarily over the counter.23 In all, Tauber and Salomon formed over
2,700 contracts for foreign currency.
Tauber's approach to trading prompted the district court to desig-
nate Tauber a "sophisticated foreign currency trader."24 Tauber ap-
proached his trading strictly as an investor. He continually monitored
the trades on a computer network designed to track exchange rates.
He maintained foreign bank accounts which he used to trade. Instead
of receiving the currency, he would "offset" the transactions. 25 Tauber
was Salomon's only non-institutional client during the trading period.
Tauber's trading turned sour in March 1991. His investments de-
clined in value, and Salomon demanded that Tauber cover the transac-
tions. 26 Tauber's bill for sixty-eight trades totaled nearly $26 million.2 7
When Tauber refused to pay, Salomon sued for breach of contract.
Tauber's chief defense was the illegality of the contracts due to
violation of the CEA.28 Tauber's argument was twofold: (1) Under
the Treasury Amendment, "transactions in" foreign currency included
only forward contracts, not futures and options;29 and (2) Tauber, an
individual, could not be exempt by the Treasury Amendment because
the amendment exempts only institutions.30 Because the futures and
options between Tauber and Salomon were over the counter, and
neither the contracts nor Tauber qualified for the Treasury Amend-
ment exemption, the contracts were unenforceable due to illegality.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 "Offsetting" is a common practice in the futures industry. To offset, a trader will sell
a second identical contract in the opposite position of his original purchase. The two con-
tracts cancel each other out, netting zero for the trade. By offsetting, the trader avoids the
necessity to take delivery of the underlying spot asset. He does so by satisfying the future
delivery obligation with a counter-transaction. See PHtIP McBPunE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, COMMODITIES REGULATION § 1.04 (2d ed. 1989).
26 Tauber 1, 795 F. Supp. at 771.
27 Originally, Tauber owed approximately $30 million. However, Salomon used
Tauber's collateral to satisfy $4 million of the debt. Because most of the collateral Tauber
offered were letters of credit, Salomon could not reach the remainder of the debt. Tauber
II, 8 F.3d 966, 970 (4th Cir. 1993).
28 Tauber 1, 795 F. Supp. at 769 and n.2. Tauber responded with a number of affirma-
tive defenses and counterclaims. Among these were fraud, duress, breach of fiduciary duty,
estoppel, and negligence. The district court disposed of all but the CEA claim without writ-
ten opinion.
29 Id. At trial, Tauber argued that options were "transactions involving" foreign cur-
rency. On appeal, Tauber expanded this argument to include futures. This argument was
based on the idea that the Treasury Amendment exempts only transactions in the actual
commodity, not futures and options based on the spot assets. See infra note 46 and accompa-
nying text.
30 Tauber I, 795 F. Supp. at 769 and n.2.
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B. District Court Holding
On a motion for summary judgment, the district court held for
Salomon. The decision hinged upon "whether certain foreign cur-
rency trading contracts are exempt from CEA regulation."3 1
The court reviewed the history of the CEA and analyzed the scope
of the act, particularly the Treasury Amendment.3 2 The court con-
cluded that the CEA intended to include "virtually every good, article,
right, or interest" as a commodity,3 3 but Congress adopted the Treas-
ury Amendment to exempt "transactions in foreign currency."34 Inter-
preting the language of the Treasury Amendment, the court
enumerated the principles of statutory interpretation35 and concluded
that the Treasury Amendment exempted Tauber's transactions from
regulation. The court held that "the phrase 'transactions in foreign
currency' plainly and unambiguously means any transaction . .. in
which foreign currency is the commodity or subject matter."36
Tauber argued that the Treasury Amendment was applicable only
to an informal network of banks and institutions (the interbank mar-
ket).37 Because these banks' and institutions' transactions in foreign
currency are subject to banking regulations, the Treasury Amendment
exempted them from the CEA.3 8 Because the Treasury Amendment
was adopted only to prevent dual regulation of the interbank market
by the CFTC and bank regulators, individuals could not be included in
the interbank market. The court rejected this reasoning, concluding
that the Treasury Amendment was in no way restricted to the in-
terbank market.3 9 In its analysis, the court examined the history of the
CEA and the Treasury Amendment, but refused to modify its statutory
interpretation according to legislative history.40 Because the court had
concluded that " 'transactions in foreign currency' plainly and unam-
biguously" included futures and options, the legislative history that re-
stricted the exemption to banks and institutions was irrelevant.41
31 Id.
32 Id. at 771-73.
33 Id. at 772.
34 Id
35 Id. at 773. The court began with the language of the statute. If this revealed Con-
gressional intent, no further inquiry was warranted. The plain meaning of the statute would
be rejected only if there was strong evidence of contrary Congressional intent. Id.
36 Id. Tauber challenged this broad construction of the Treasury Amendment, arguing
that the phrase "transactions in" foreign currency did not include options on commodities.
The district court disagreed. Once options are exercised, the trade becomes a "transaction
in" foreign currency. Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 773-74.
39 Id. at 774.
40 I. at 769-73.
41 Id. at 773. Compare the district court's analysis to the court of appeals' analysis
which limited its holding to the interbank market. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying
text.
The district court's analysis drew sharp criticism from the CFrC. In a report on over-
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An important aspect of the district court's analysis was its determi-
nation that Tauber was a sophisticated trader.42 Citing his extensive
trading, his ownership of a trading company, and his active participa-
tion in the trading, the court found that the record evidence sup-
ported its designation of Tauber as sophisticated. 43 This finding of
fact was critical to the case. Although the district court broadly applied
the Treasury Amendment exemption to all traders, the court of ap-
peals limited the exemption to the interbank market. In doing so, the
court of appeals adopted the district court's finding in its inclusion of
the sophisticated trader in the interbank market.44
C. The Fourth Circuit's Decision
On appeal, Tauber restated his argument.45 First, the Treasury
Amendment exemption of "transactions in" foreign currency excludes
futures and options because these contracts, as derivatives, are "trans-
actions involving" foreign currency.4 6 Second, assuming futures and
options were exempt, Tauber could not be a part of the "interbank
market" that Congress intended to exempt because this market in-
cludes only banks and institutions. 47 Salomon argued that the Treas-
ury Amendment is a broadly-worded exemption that applies to a broad
range of over-the-counter transactions. 48 The court of appeals held for
Salomon and affirmed the district court, but its analysis differed. The
Fourth Circuit focused on the interpretation of "transactions in" for-
eign currency and the traders included in the interbank market.
the-counter derivatives, the CFTC declared that "the district court went beyond the facts of
the case before it by holding that ail transactions in which foreign currency is the actual
subject matter of an off-exchange contract for future delivery are excluded from the CEA
under the Treasury Amendment." COMMODITY FrruREs TRADING COMMISSION, OTC DERVA-
TIVE MARKRS AND THEIR REGULATiON 148 (Oct. 1993). In essence, the CFTC feared a broad
reading of the decision would permit over-the-counter trading by any party. Id. at 150-51.
42 Tauber , 795 F. Supp. at 770.
43 Id.
44 See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
45 Tauber II, 8 F.3d. 966, 978-79 (4th Cir. 1993). Tauber also appealed the district
court's holding on three state law claims: a New York anti-bucket shop law violation, a negli-
gence counterclaim, and a breach of covenant counter-claim. Although the court of appeals
ruled on these issues, the holding is irrelevant to the CEA analysis. Therefore, this Note will
not discuss these claims.
46 Id. at 973-74. Tauber expanded this aspect of his argument on appeal to include
futures in addition to options. At trial, Tauber argued bnly for options to be excluded from
"transactions in foreign currency."
47 Id.
48 Id. The court also explained the positions of the amid curiae. One side favored regu-
lation in order to prevent the abuses Congress wished to avoid, while the other favored over-
the-counter trading in order to improve or maintain market efficiency. In all, nine briefs
were entered amici curiae. The groups included: the United States Department of Treasury,
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York's Foreign Exchange Committee, the Futures Industry
Association, and the Managed Futures Association (for Salomon); and the CFTC, the Board
of Trade of Chicago, the State of Nevada, the State of Idaho, and the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (for Tauber). Id. at 974.
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1. Summary of the CEA and the Treasury Amendment
In its construction of the language of the statute, the court ex-
amined which types of derivatives the Treasury Amendment exempts
from regulation.49 Tauber argued that "transactions in" foreign cur-
rency could not include futures and options; these contracts, as deriva-
tives, are "transactions involving" foreign currency.50 Thus, the phrase
in the Treasury Amendment could only include spot transactions and
forward contracts.
At the outset of its analysis, the court enumerated the principles of
statutory construction. The court began with the words of the statute.
If these words conclusively expressed Congressional intent, no further
inquiry was warranted.51 To gauge this intent, the court assumed that
Congress used words reflecting its intent, that all words had a purpose
and should be read consistently, and that "the statute's true meaning
provides a rational response to the relevant situation." 52 The court
presumed that any language added by amendment was not "surplus-
age," that undefined terms reflected the plain meaning of those words,
and that the statute did not contradict itself.53
The court construed the phrase "transactions in foreign currency"
logically, focusing on whether futures and options could be included
in the language. The court concluded that "the phrase 'transactions in
foreign currency' is broad and unqualified." 54 The breadth of the lan-
guage was confirmed by the "unless" clause that followed. Logically
applied, an "unless" clause must limit a broadly stated exception. As
the court explained: "The class of transactions covered by the general
clause 'transactions in foreign currency' must include a larger class
than those removed from it by the 'unless' clause in order to give the
latter clause meaning."55 According to the court's analysis, "transac-
tions in" foreign currency means all transactions-spot and deriva-
tives-in the currency.
The court verified this interpretation by comparing the Treasury
Amendment to other parts of the statute. First, the court cited section
la(11) of the CEA, the "future delivery" definition. 56 This section ex-
cludes from the term "future delivery" all cash sales for future delivery
49 Id. at 975-76.
50 Id. at 973.
51 Id. at 975.
52 Id. The court's meaning of this language is not clear. It appears that the court would
read the statute as addressing the problem which Congress intended to legislate.
53 Id. Interestingly, the court cited no authority for its principles of statutory construc-
tion. However, its recitation of the law is consistent with, and closely echoes, Matala v. Con-
solidated Coal Co., 647 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1981). Malta was one of the primary cases upon
which the district court relied for its interpretation. See Tauber I, 795 F. Supp. 768, 773 (E.D.
Va. 1993).
54 Tauber II, 8 F.3d at 975.
55 Id.
56 7 U.S.C. § la(11) (Supp. IV 1992).
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(i.e. forwards), and the section was in force before 1974.5 7 When the
Treasury Amendment was enacted in 1974, the CEA already excluded
spots and forwards from coverage. Congress added the Treasury
Amendment to exempt a broader range of contracts-specifically, fu-
tures and options. 58 Therefore, "transactions in" foreign currency
must refer to the newly-exempted contracts.
In the second comparison, the court cited section 5 of the CEA.59
This section refers to futures as "transactions in commodities."r ° As
the court reasoned, given that Congress referred to futures as "transac-
tions in" a commodity in Section 5, "transactions in foreign currency"
must include futures whenever the language appears in the CEA.61
From the two examples, the court reasoned that its interpretation of
"transactions in foreign currency" as including futures was internally
consistent with other parts of the CEA.
The court addressed Tauber's argument that the Treasury
Amendment only exempted spots and forwards. The court rejected
this argument, considering forwards identical to futures for analytical
purposes. 62 As the court asked: "Why would a cash forward be analyti-
cally different from a future? Neither transaction involves contempo-
raneous delivery. Both transactions involve the purchase of a
promise-a contract right-and only indirectly concern the underly-
ing subject matter."63 Reasoning that forwards and futures are suffi-
ciently similar, the court decided that futures must be "transactions in
foreign currency."64
Expanding its conclusion, the court summarily applied its futures
analysis to all transactions in foreign currency, including options. Ac-
cording to the court, "there is no principled reason to distinguish be-
tween [futures and options] in this context."65 Therefore, Tauber's
trades in foreign currency options, like futures, are "transactions in"
foreign currency. As the statute plainly states, these contracts are ex-
empt from the CEA.
2. Legislative History of the Treasury Amendment
Having established that futures and options were excluded from
CEA coverage, the court focused on the legislative history of the Treas-
ury Amendment.66 To determine whether the interbank market could
include an individual trader, the court reframed the issue from which
57 Id.
58 Tauber I, 8 F.3d at 975.
59 Id. at 976 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1988)).
60 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1988).
61 Tauber II, 8 F.3d at 976.
62 Id. at 975-76.
63 Id. at 975.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 976.
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transactions are exempt from CEA coverage to which participants in the
market are exempt.67
In response to Tauber's claim that only the banks and institutions
were exempt from the CEA, the court analyzed Congressional intent
regarding the interbank market. The court acknowledged that the
Treasury Department was primarily concerned with the interbank mar-
ket, but the participants in this market were not solely banks and insti-
tutions.68 When the Treasury Department wrote to the Congressional
committee about the interbank market, it referred to "an informal net-
work of banks and dea/ers 69 and expressed concern for "an adverse
impact on the usefulness and efficiency of foreign exchange markets
for traders and investors."70 The court concluded that the true distinc-
tion was not, as Tauber argued, between banks and individuals. 71 The
Treasury Letter instead distinguished between participants in the in-
formal network and traders on organized exchanges. 72 The Treasury
Amendment addressed the nature of the trade-whether it appeared
on an organized exchange or over the counter; the "corporate form"
of the trader was irrelevant to the inquiry.73 Had Congress truly in-
tended to exempt only banks, clear statutory language would have so
declared. 74 Instead, the Treasury Amendment exempted "all trading
off organized exchanges," including the interbank market.75 Because
the transactions at issue were between "sophisticated financial profes-
sionals," the Treasury Amendment exempted the contracts from the
CEA.
The court qualified its broad holding.76 Tauber argued that an
interpretation exempting all transactions would allow circumvention
of the CEA by anyone who traded over the counter.77 The court de-
cided that Tauber "misapprehended the issue which this case
presents."78 The court concluded that its holding does not apply to
mass marketing of futures to the general public. Re-emphasizing the
nature of its holding, the court stated that the Treasury Amendment
exempts only sophisticated, large-scale foreign currency traders.79 The
67 It is important to note the chief difference between the court of appeals' and the
district court's analyses. Where the Fourth Circuit qualified its analysis as inapplicable to
mass marketing to the trading public, the district court broadly applied the Treasury Amend-
ment exemption to all trading, See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
68 Tauber I, 8 F.3d at 976. The correspondence between the Treasury Department and
the Congressional committee is referred to as the Treasury Letter. See supra note 13.
69 Tauber , 8 F.3d at 977 (quoting Treasury Letter, supra note 13, at 5887).
70 Id. (quoting Treasury Letter, supra note 13, at 5888).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 978.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. The court re-emphasized its holding in its response to Tauber's concern that the
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general public must comply with the CFTC contract-market monopoly.
3. The Case Law: Redefining the Issue
In comparing authorities, the Fourth Circuit promoted its inter-
pretation of the Treasury Amendment and the interbank market. The
Seventh and Second Circuits had previously addressed the Treasury
Amendment and its application to futures and options, but both cases
involved trading by the general public on organized exchanges. The
Fourth Circuit held that the cases did not apply to sophisticated finan-
cial traders trading off-exchange.80 Although the court acknowledged
that other circuits had interpreted the statute differently, it concluded
that the authority did not apply to the facts in Tauber because those
cases involved contract markets trading with the general public, not
the interbank market.81 From its brief review of the facts and holdings
of the two cases, it appears that the Fourth Circuit addressed the case
law as an afterthought; the court's chief emphasis was statutory
interpretation.
I1. Economic Aspects of Foreign Currency Derivatives8 2
The foreign exchange market is perhaps the world's largest finan-
cial market. The participants include governments, banks, institu-
tional investors, multinational corporations, financial speculators, and
travelers who change their home currency to spend abroad. With its
breadth and importance to so many market participants, the foreign
exchange market touches every aspect of the world economy.
The holding in Tauber involves economic theories of the foreign
exchange derivatives market. Understanding the basic premises of
these theories is critical to appreciating the importance of the Tauber
decision.
A. Fundamentals of Futures and Options
Futures and options reduce the risks of buying or selling a com-
modity.8 3 A trader who wishes to purchase a commodity in the future
but fears increasing prices can reduce his exposure to price fluctuation
by "hedging" his risk through the purchase of a future or option in the
Fourth Circuit would become a base for off-exchange trades: "This case does not involve
mass marketing to small investors ... and our holding in no way implies that such marketing
is exempt from the CEA." Id.
80 Id. at 977-78.
81 Id. at 978. Perhaps the most revealing aspect of this part of the decision is the sum-
mary nature of the court's analysis of the case law. See i& at 977-78.
82 This rudimentary recitation of economic principles in no way represents a thorough
analysis. The purpose of this section of the Note is to present a context for the court's
decision.
83 SeeJOHN F. MARsHALL, FUTuREs AND OPTIONS CONTRACrING 52-53 (1989).
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commodity.8 4 For example, a person intends to sell a commodity for
use three months in the future but fears sharp drops in the price. She
may protect against sharp drops in the price by purchasing a future
contract for the commodity to be delivered in three months. The fu-
ture contract guarantees a presently-agreed-upon price and eliminates
the risk of falling prices. Thus, the person reduces (hedges) her risk of
purchasing the commodity.
The hedger's risk of loss will not disappear, so another party must
assume the risk which the hedger has foregone. Thus, a "speculator"
will purchase a position opposite the hedger.8 5 In the above example,
the speculator will purchase a future contract assuming the price will
rise. The speculator assumes the risk which the hedger has avoided.
As compensation for this risk, the speculator will reap higher profits if
his wager is correct. Thus, the hedger and the speculator complement
each other's functions.
The interaction of these participants benefits commodity markets
in two ways. First, their trading in futures (and options) aids the pric-
ing mechanism of the market. Each time a hedger and speculator shift
risk, the price of the derivative helps to determine a fair price for the
underlying spot asset. Second, the interplay of supply and demand of
derivatives between the hedger and the speculator reduces the costs of
commodity contracting.8 6 This increases liquidity and efficiency in the
commodity markets. In short, trading in futures and options reduces
risk for the hedger, increases profits for the speculator, and benefits
the market as a whole.
B. Futures and Options in the Foreign Exchange Market
1. Fluctuation of Exchange Rates and Use of Derivatives
The foreign exchange market is a very volatile market which econ-
omists find hard to predict. Theories of the fluctuation of the ex-
change rates are based on relative purchasing power,8 7 balance of
payments between countries,8 currency as an asset,89 a reflection of
interests rates and the supply of money,90 and the "rational expecta-
tions" of purchasers of currency forwards. 91 Regardless of specific the-
84 Id. at 53. The most basic hedging device is the forward contract which guarantees
future delivery for a presently-agreed-upon price. However, the standardization of future
prices often make these a more attractive alternative. Id. at 55.
85 See TuCKER, supra note 2, at 137-39. A speculator has no real stake in the commodity.
Instead, the speculator enters the market solely to profit from incurring risk. For a compari-
son of the commodity speculator to the security investor, see JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note
25, § 1.14.
86 See MARSHALL, supra note 83, at 55.
87 NICK DOUCH, THE ECONOMICS OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE 3 (1989).
88 Id. at 13.
89 Id. at 23.
90 Id. at 29.
91 Id. at 37.
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ories, exchange rates are relative prices of money influenced by
financial, economic, and political factors.92
Despite the wealth of economic theories, exchange rates are diffi-
cult, often impossible, to predict.93 If a market participant intends to
deal overseas, monetary flows can result in substantial losses if the ex-
change rates are improperly predicted. A trader in foreign currencies
will seek stability and predictability in the face of such risk.
In the foreign exchange market, as in any spot asset market, fu-
tures and options reduce risk in trading and stabilize the market. Fi-
nancial planners, as hedgers, purchase futures and options to reduce
risk, and market participants, as speculators, profit from the use of
derivatives by hedgers. The result is a reduction in currency risk with
an accompanying profit from financial speculation.
2. Users of Foreign Currency Derivatives
Banks, investors, and multinational corporations use foreign cur-
rency derivatives in varying degrees. Each entity will use a derivative
either to minimize business and investment risk or to speculate.
As an example of a corporation, an American manufacturer pro-
poses to export its products to Germany. The purchase will take place
in three months' time, and the corporation will take Deutschmarks
(DMs) as payment. If the dollar rises against the DM, profits will be
eroded. Therefore, concern over volatile interest rates9 4 causes worry
within the corporation. As a hedge against the devaluation of the
Deutschmark, the company purchases a future contract on American
dollars against the German currency. This future locks in a current
price for future delivery and protects against a strong dollar. In other
words, the company knows it will receive a constant rate against the
DM, and its profits will be predictable. Thus, the corporation has
"hedged" its risk and ensured that its profits will remain relatively high
against the dollar when received in DM.
Another example of users of foreign currency derivatives are insti-
tutional investors. Here, the investor (a mutual fund or pension fund)
can hedge risks when purchasing equity in foreign corporations. For
example, if a U.S. mutual fund chooses to invest in a foreign corpora-
tion, a strong dollar could devalue their equity investment. Therefore,
92 Id. at 29.
93 See generally Bluford H. Putnam, The Science and Art of Forecasting Exchange Rates, in
FOREIGN EXCHANGE: FUNCTIONS, LIMrrs, AND RisKs 140 (Jackie Whitley ed., 1992).
94 The effect of interest rates on exchange rates was graphically illustrated on February
4, 1994. When the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) Chairman announced a .25% increase in
short-term interest rates, the dollar surged against foreign currencies. The J.P. Morgan In-
dex , a composite of the dollar's performance against nineteen foreign currencies, rose .5%.
U.S. Dollar, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 1994, at Cl. The move by the Fed kicked off a wave of
speculation on the dollar despite currency analysts' belief that the dollar would not
strengthen against foreign currencies. Gene Cotler, Move by Fed Puts Dollar in Limelight,
Prompts Round of Speculative Buying, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 7, 1994, at C15.
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the fund can hedge against such risk by purchasing a future on the
foreign currency, assuring a single price and limiting the risks of cur-
rency fluctuation.9 5
A third user of foreign currency derivatives is the consumer of
investment information. As discussed above, derivatives provide up-to-
date information on the price of the underlying spot assets. There-
fore, all participants in the foreign exchange market benefit from the
pricing function of foreign currency derivatives.
IV. Commodity Futures Regulation Under the CEA
A. The Commodity Exchange Act
1. A Short History of Commodities Regulation
The CEA originated in the 1920s as an effort to stem the tide of
"bucket shops" and other speculative abuses. 96 Following decades of
populist sentiment against financial manipulation of agricultural prod-
ucts, 9 7 Congress in 1921 passed the Futures Trading Act.98 Recogniz-
ing the benefits of legitimate futures trading in agricultural products,99
Congress focused on abusive practices. The Futures Trading Act was
later renamed the Grain Futures Act, 100 then the Commodity Ex-
change Act (CEA).10 1 The fundamental concept underlying the CEA
95 See Carolyn Sykes, Strategic Currency Management in Foreign Equity Portfolios, in FOREIGN
EXCHANGE: FUNCTIONS, LIMITS, AND RisKs 110 (Jackie Whitley ed., 1992).
96 A "bucket shop" was a trading establishment where customers could gamble on the
exchange prices without reporting the transaction to a board of trade. The shop would as-
sume the risks of net positions by offsetting the bets against its funds. If the customers won
big against the shop, however, the shop would pack up and take the funds, leaving the cus-
tomers holding worthless futures. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HisrORY OF COMMODrIY Fu-
TURES TRADING AND rrs REGULATioN 9-10 (1987). Aside from the bucket shops, Congress'
chief concern was the bald manipulation that was prevalent in commodity trading. See Wil-
liam L. Stein, The Exchange-Trading Requirement of the Commodity Exchange Act, 41 VAND. L. REv.
473, 477 (1988).
97 The populist movement, backed by the power of the farmers and the oratory of their
representatives, was a strong (and colorful) movement against financial innovation. As one
author reports: "Senator Capper further charged that the Chicago Board of Trade was a
Igambling hell,' that it was the 'world's greatest gambling house': 'Monte Carlo or the Ca-
sino at Habana are not to be compared with it.' " MARKH", supra note 96, at 13.
98 Futures Trading Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-66, 42 Stat. 187.
99 See Stein, supra note 96, at 477. The economic benefits of commodity derivatives are
discussed supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
100 In 1922, the Supreme Court held the Futures Trading Act unconstitutional as an
overreaching of Congress' taxing power. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922). However, Con-
gress reacted immediately and passed the Grain Futures Act, based on its power under the
Commerce Clause. The new law was essentially the same, and its constitutionality was later
upheld. Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
101 In 1936, Congress revised the Grain Futures Act and renamed it the Commodity
Exchange Act. The Great Depression ruined the commodities markets. Furthermore, specu-
lators flooded into the less-regulated commodities markets after the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 deterred speculation in securities. In response, Congress moved to stem increased
speculation in commodities. Thus, the CEA created a new administration within the Depart-
ment of Agriculture to monitor the contract markets and foster "self-regulation." See MARK-
HAM, supra note 96, at 24-28.
"SOPHISTICATED TRADER" IN FOREIGN CURRENCY
was the restriction of futures trading to government-approved contract
markets and an accompanying ban on all futures trading not con-
ducted on such a market. 10 2
From its inception until the early 1970s, the CEA was adminis-
tered by the Department of Agriculture, regulating chiefly commodi-
ties found on the farm,10 3 but in the 1960s, a number of problems
arose. As the commodity futures industry developed, commodities,
such as sugar, which fell outside the scope of the CEA, became the
subjects of speculation. 10 4 Self-regulation of the contract markets be-
gan to fail,10 5 and futures were becoming increasingly critical to pric-
ing of the underlying commodity.' 0 6 The need to revise the CEA
became apparent as more and more problems fell beyond the reach of
the statute.
Responding to these problems as well as substantial public pres-
sure, 10 7 Congress greatly revised the CEA in 1974 with the passage of
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act (CFTCA). 0 8 This
act was a comprehensive revamping of the CEA. The most important
change was the creation of the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion, the independent regulatory agency charged with supervision of
the contract markets. The 1974 amendments granted this new agency
exclusive jurisdiction over commodity futures and options. 10 9 Two
other important changes were the expansion of the definition of a
"commodity,"" l0 and at the suggestion of the Department of Treasury,
the adoption of a provision addressing the interbank trading of for-
eign currencies and other instruments. 1 '
Since 1974, the CEA has undergone a number of changes, the
most significant of which was the 1982 Congressional action to resolve
ajurisdictional conflict between the CFTC and the SEC. 112 Currently,
the CFTC has jurisdiction over all futures and options sold on
commodities." 3
102 67 CONG. REc. H1318 (daily ed. May 11, 1921).
103 See MARaAm, supra note 96, at 35-47.
104 Id. at 50-52.
105 Id. at 62.
106 Id. at 60-61.
107 As an example of public sentiment, in 1973, the Des Moines Register published a series
of articles which greatly criticized the commodities industry. Chiefly, the articles criticized a
lack of control in the industries and alleged rigging of prices. Id. at 58-59.
108 Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
109 See 7 U.S.C. § 2(ii) (Supp. IV 1992).
110 This definition greatly expanded the scope of the CEA by including a list of agricul-
tural products and "all services, rights, and interests" as commodities. 7 U.S.C. § la(3)
(Supp. IV 1992). See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
I1 Codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(ii) (Supp. IV 1992) (this later became known as the Treasury
Amendment).
112 Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (codified as amended
at 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
113 The definition of a "commodity" has often reached beyond the definitions section of
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2. Scope of the CEA: The Contract-Market Monopoly
a. Regulation of Futures and Options
i. Section 4: Broad Prohibition of Off-Market Futures
The essence of the CEA is its broad prohibition of trading of over-
the-counter commodity futures contracts.1 14 To enforce this ban, the
CEA requires all futures trading be conducted on CFTC-authorized ex-
changes. The effect is a regulatory monopoly of contract markets by
the federal government.
Section 4 of the CEA prohibits any person from offering, con-
tracting, or dealing in "a contract for the purchase or sale of a com-
modity for future delivery . . . unless - (1) such transaction is
conducted on or subject to the rules of a board of trade which has
been designated by the Commission as a 'contract market' for such
commodity."11 5 Thus, all trades must be conducted on a CFTC-desig-
nated contract market. The CFTC approves these markets, then peri-
odically monitors their trading practices. 116 By prohibiting commodity
futures trading by any means other than those approved by the Com-
mission, the CEA subjects all trading to CFTC regulations.
ii. Exception of Deferred Delivery
The CEA regulates primarily futures, which are standardized and
traded for investment purposes. By contrast, the forward contract mar-
ket involves individually-negotiated contracts where the parties primar-
ily intend to trade in the underlying commodity. From its inception,
the CEA targeted only futures markets. 1 7 Therefore, the CEA's defini-
tion of "contract for future delivery" (i.e. futures) excludes those trans-
actions in which the parties anticipate actual delivery. 118 Because of
this exclusion, forwards are not "contract[s] for the purchase or sale of
a commodity for future delivery."119 As the CFTC has stated:
Congress intended to permit only: 1) those futures transactions which
were executed through the facilities of the designated contract mar-
ket, markets regulated by the federal government, which were re-
quired, in turn, to regulate the activities of their members; and 2) cash
the CF'C. The creation of "hybrid" instruments has required creative regulation by the
CFTC. See generally Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Hybrid Instruments Under the Commodity
Exchange Act: A Call for Alternatives, 1990 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1 (1990). The courts have
wrestled with the definitions of commodities and securities regarding hybrid instruments. See
Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1987).
114 See Stein, supra note 96, at 477.
115 7 U.S.C. § 6(a)(1) (1988). Subsection (2) of this section requires the contract to be
executed by a member of the market, and subsection (3) requires the contract to be evi-
denced in writing.
116 See infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
117 See MARujQ, supra note 96, at 12-13.
118 7 U.S.C. § la(ll) (Supp. IV 1992).
119 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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commodity transactions for deferred shipment or delivery. 120
Without this provision, the CFTC would regulate all transactions where
the parties agreed to a present sale and a future delivery. Forward con-
tracts are beyond Congress' concern, and the CEA leaves this market
untouched.1 21
iii. The Options Restriction
The preceding sections discussed the CEA's treatment of futures
and forwards. The CEA has also adopted special rules for options
trading.
Abuses of commodity options prompted the CFTC to ban all such
trading in 1978.122 Later, Congress codified this ban. Section 4c of
the CEA prohibits all option trading in commodities unless authorized
by CFTC rules. 123
In 1982, Congress instructed the CFTC to initiate a pilot program
to allow commodity option trading on the contract markets.' 24 Con-
gress approved the program in 1986 and ordered the CFTC to end the
pilot status of the program.125 In 1987, the CFTC amended its rules to
allow trading on the contract markets.' 26
This scheme of regulation for option trading parallels futures
trading regulation. As long as the trade is executed on a CFTC-ap-
proved contract market, CFTC rules for the exchanges apply; other-
wise, the trade is prohibited.
iv. Broad Definition of "Commodity"
The breadth of the CEA is evident in its expansive definition of a
commodity; the definition section of the act fortifies the contract-mar-
ket monopoly by extending the CEA to a vast array of commodities.
Prior to 1974, the definition of a commodity was fairly narrow, but the
CFTCA greatly expanded the definition to include nearly all agricul-
tural products12 7 and "all other goods and articles... and all services,
rights, and interests."128
120 In re Stovall, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 20,941, at
23,781 (C.F.T.C. Dec. 6, 1979). This statement was specific to the case and failed to mention
the other primary exception to CFI'C regulations: the spot transaction.
121 Another type of contract which the CEA does not regulate is the spot contract where
parties exchange a commodity for present sale.
122 17 C.F.R. § 32.11 (1978). This general ban contained certain exceptions not relevant
to the discussion.
123 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
124 Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6c(c)
(1982)).
125 Futures Trading Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-641 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6c(c) (Supp.
IV 1992)).
126 17 C.F.R. § 32.1(a) (1993).
127 The statute contains a grocery list of specific products, from wool tops to Irish pota-
toes. 7 U.S.C. § la(5) (Supp. V 1992).
128 Id.
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The importance of this definition is twofold. First, it expanded
the definition to include certain agricultural products which had been
the target of market crashes in the 1960s. Second, and most impor-
tant, the new definition included a broad range of financial instru-
ments not previously subject to CEA jurisdiction.
b. CFTC Enforcement Mechanisms
In order to enforce the contract-market monopoly, the CFTC is
granted exclusive jurisdiction over futures trading.' 29 The commission
can designate contract markets,130 register participants in the mar-
kets,131 and receive complaints about registrants.' 32 Furthermore, the
CFTC may suspend the designation of a contract market, 33 suspend
an individual's privilege of trading on a market, 3 4 and assess monetary
penalties for violations of the Act.' 35 In short, Congress has granted
the CFTC wide enforcement authority to compel compliance with the
CEA.13 6
B. The Treasury Amendment
An important exception to the contract-market monopoly is the
so-called "Treasury Amendment" that reads:
Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to govern or in any way be appli-
cable to transactions in foreign currency, security warrants, security
rights, resales of installment loan contracts, repurchase options, gov-
ernment securities, or mortgages and mortgage purchase commit-
ments, unless such transactions involve the sale thereof for future
delivery conducted on a board of trade.' 3
7
The Treasury Amendment allows over-the-counter trading of a range
of financial instruments by exempting these transactions from the con-
tract-market monopoly. However, the administrative comments and
the litigation in the two decades since the Amendment's enactment
indicate that it has not been accepted as a clear statement of the
law.138
To understand the Amendment, one must explore its origins.
129 Id. § 2.
130 7 U.S.C. § 2a (1988). This designation is subject to minimum requirements enumer-
ated in the section.
131 7 U.S.C. § 12a(1) (Supp. IV 1992). These "participants" include merchants, brokers,
advisors, and a number of other participants in the markets.
132 7 U.S.C. § 18 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
133 7 U.S.C. § 7b (Supp. V 1992).
134 Id. § 9.
135 Id. § 9a. The enumerated powers are just a few means by which the CFrC may en-
force the statute.
136 Id. § 15. The CFrC Division of Enforcement is charged with compelling compliance
by initiating actions. For a brief summary of the division's powers and duties, seeJoHNsoN &
HAZEN, supra note 25, § 4.12.
137 7 U.S.C. § 2(ii) (Supp. IV 1992).
138 See generally CFTC v. American Bd. of Trade, 803 F.2d 1243 (2d Cir. 1986); Board of
Trade of Chicago v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1982); CFTC and State of Ga. v. Sterling
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When the Congressional Committee on Agriculture and Forestry con-
sidered amending the CEA in 1974, the Department of Treasury op-
posed the potential scope and lack of clarity of the proposed
amendments. 139 Primarily, the Treasury Department feared an over-
lap of the banking and commodity regulations.1 40 Accordingly, the
Department of Treasury wrote a letter to the Congressional committee
considering the CFTCA to express its concerns and suggest
alternatives. 14
1
The Treasury Letter addressed trading in foreign currency by
banks and institutions.142 A large interbank market of foreign cur-
rency traders existed. 143 This market, already subject to banking regu-
lations, 144 required no additional federal oversight. As the letter
explained,
Virtually all futures trading in foreign currencies in the United States
is carried out through an informal network of banks and dealers. This
dealer market, which consists primarily of the large banks, has proved
highly efficient in serving the needs of international business in hedg-
ing the risks that stem from foreign exchange rate movements. The
participants in this market are sophisticated and informed institutions,
unlike the participants in the organized exchanges, which, in some
cases, include individuals and small investors who may need to be pro-
tected by some form of governmental regulation. 145
When the Treasury Department notified Congress of the potential
over-regulation of the interbank market, Congress responded by
adopting the Treasury Amendment, taken nearly verbatim from the
letter.
The scope of the Treasury Amendment is ambiguous, and it is
arguable whether it applies to individual traders who participate in the
interbank market. Although the letter clearly states that "foreign cur-
rency futures trading, other than on organized exchanges, should not
be regulated by the [CFTC],"146 the letter repeatedly expresses concern
for "banks and other institutions." 147 Reading the language of the stat-
ute, a court could conclude that the exemption applies to one of two
categories of traders: (1) institutions only or (2) a broad range of par-
ticipants in the market, individual or institutional.
Capital Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,783
(N.D. Ga. 1981).
139 Treasury Letter, supra note 13, at 5887.
140 Id.
141 Treasury Letter, supra note 13.
142 Id.
'43 Id.
144 The institutional participants in the interbank market are generally subject to federal
banking regulations. See generally 12 C.F.R. §§ 347, 351 (1993); 31 C.F.R. §§ 103, 128 (1993).
145 Treasury Letter, supra note 13, at 5888.
146 Id. at 5887.
147 Id.
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C. The Case Law Interpretation of the Treasury Amendment
Judicial interpretation of the Treasury Amendment is limited.
Prior to Tauber, only the Second and Seventh Circuits had interpreted
the amendment,1 48 and neither had closely examined its application to
the interbank market.
The Seventh Circuit was the first court of appeals to interpret the
Treasury Amendment. In Board of Trade v. SEC,149 the court addressed
the trading of options on Government National Mortgage Association
mortgage-backed certificates (Ginnie Maes). Essentially, a jurisdic-
tional dispute between the SEC and the CFTC arose in the late
1970s, °50 and Board of Trade brought the issue to light. 151 The Chicago
Board of Options Exchange (CBOE) sought and received SEC ap-
proval for a modification of its exchange rules to allow options trading
on Ginnie Maes on the CBOE. The Board of Trade of the City of
Chicago sued 152 claiming that the SEC lacked jurisdiction over the rule
approval.' 53
The CBOE argued that the Treasury Amendment, by exempting
"transactions in ... government securities," placed the exchange trad-
ing beyond CFTCjurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argu-
ment holding that an option in a commodity could not be a
"transaction in" that commodity if the option were not exercised. If,
however, the holder of the option exercises his right to purchase, the
sale becomes a transaction in that commodity. 54 Because the options
traded on the CBOE were purchased for investment and never exe-
cuted, the contracts could not be "transactions in" Ginnie Maes.
The court explained its holding in light of the Treasury Amend-
ment's exclusion of banks and institutions. As the court stated, "from
the legislative history, it is quite clear that the Treasury [A]mendment
was adopted by Congress only to prevent dual regulation by the CFTC
and bank regulatory agencies of the banks and other sophisticated in-
stitutions that ordinarily trade in the enumerated financial instru-
148 A number of district courts have examined the Treasury Amendment. See, e.g., CFTC
and State of Ga. v. Sterling Capital Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 21,169, at 24,783 (N.D. Ga. 1981). Some of these cases are cited in the circuit court
opinions, and the appellate courts generally followed the analyses of those cases.
149 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1982), vacated as moot, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982). Board of Trade
was vacated by the Supreme Court due to Congress' amendment of the CEA in 1982 to
resolve the jurisdictional dispute between the SEC and the CFTC.
150 SeeJOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 25, § 4.25.
151 The chief issue in the case was which regulatory agency had jurisdiction over options
on Ginnie Maes, as they are both "commodities" and "securities." Board of Trade, 677 F.2d at
1138.
152 The Board of Trade's interest in the suit was its active trading of futures on Ginnie
Maes. Futures and options serve primarily the same purposes, and the instruments often
compete for investors. Id. at 1140. Thus, the Board of Trade sought uniform rules for the
trading of the instruments. Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 1154.
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ments."1 55  The Seventh Circuit concluded that the Treasury
Amendment exemption applied to banks and institutions, 156 but the
court did not address individuals who participate in the interbank mar-
ket. The holding in Board of Trade, that options are not "transactions
in" a commodity unless exercised, did not reach the issue of an individ-
ual who trades as part of the interbank market.
The Second Circuit interpreted the Treasury Amendment four
years later. In CFTC v. American Board of Trade,157 the CFTC sued to
enjoin the Ame'rican Board of Trade from offering a marketplace for
commodities to the general public because the market had not been
approved by the CFTC. 158
The defendants sought the Treasury Amendment's exemption of
"transactions in" foreign currency by arguing that options should be
excluded under this phrase. In response, the court echoed the Sev-
enth Circuit's holding: an option is not a "transaction in" a commodity
unless the option is exercised.159
The Second Circuit explained its holding in light of the purposes
of the Treasury Amendment. After explaining the origin of the Treas-
ury Amendment, the court concluded that the defendants illegally
opened a contract market. By arguing that the Treasury Amendment
exempted all transactions in foreign currency, the defendants miscon-
strued the scope of the exemption. Their argument belied "the notion
that the exception was designed to exclude from regulation foreign
currency options transactions such as those defendants engaged in with
private individuals."16 The interbank market was the limit of the
exemption.
The last clause of the quoted portion of American Board of Trade
reflects an important similarity in the Seventh and Second Circuit deci-
sions. In both cases, the courts interpreted the Treasury Amendment
exemption where the issue was a board of trade dealing with the gen-
eral public. In neither case did the court reach the issue of an individ-
ual as a member of the interbank market.
D. The CFTC and the Treasury Amendment
The CFTC has consistently applied its regulatory power as expan-
sively as possible. Charged with exclusive jurisdiction over futures and
options trading, the CFTC has viewed the Treasury Amendment as a
narrow exemption to its broad oversight powers. Specifically, the
155 Id.
156 Id. at 1154.
157 803 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1986).
158 Id. at 1244.
159 Id. at 1248 (citing Board of Trade).
160 Id. at 1249 (emphasis added).
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CFTC has interpreted the Treasury Amendment to exempt only institu-
tional traders already subject to banking regulations.
In a 1985 notice, 161 the CFTC explained that the Treasury
Amendment exemption applied only "when such transactions are en-
tered into by and between banks and certain other sophisticated and
informed institutional participants." 162 In litigation, the CFTC has
consistently argued that the exemption applies only to institutional in-
vestors. 163 In no opinion has the CFTC embraced the notion of an
individual as a participant in the interbank market.
V. The Fourth Circuit's Interpretation and the "Sophisticated
Trader"
A. The Fourth Circuit's Construction of the Law
Two critical issues arise regarding interpretation of the Treasury
Amendment. First, can the language "transactions in foreign cur-
rency" be read to exclude futures and options from regulation? Sec-
ond, does the legislative history permit the conclusion that individuals
who could reasonably be considered "sophisticated traders" are enti-
tled to the exemption? 1'
1. Interpretation of "Transactions In" Foreign Currency
The most striking aspect of the court's interpretation of the stat-
ute is the rigorous analysis of the words used by Congress. Of the
courts which have interpreted the statute, only the Fourth Circuit has
so thoroughly scrutinized the language of the Treasury Amendment.
In its interpretation, the court followed its enumerated principles of
statutory construction, 165 and relied solely on the words used by Con-
gress to determine which contracts the CEA regulates. The court con-
cluded that "under the appropriate interpretation of the Treasury
Amendment, all off-exchange transactions in foreign currency, includ-
ing futures and options, are exempted from regulation." 166
161 Trading in Foreign Currency for Future Delivery, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,983 (1985).
162 Id. at 42,984.
163 See generally Tauber II, 8 F.3d 966 (4th Cir. 1993); CFrC v. American Bd. of Trade,
803 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1986); Tauber I, 795 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Va. 1993); CFTC and State of
Ga. v. Sterling Capital Co., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 21,169,
at 24,783 (N.D. Ga. 1981); CFTC v. Standard Forex, No. CV-93-0088 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1993).
This strict view of the scope of the Treasury Amendment may be moderated in a recent
CFTC opinion. In a report of October 1993, the CFTC expressed its view that "the Treasury
Amendment does not extend to the sale of futures obligations to the general public." COM.
MODITY FuTuREs TRADING COMMISSION, supra note 41, at 155. In this report, the CFTC did
not address its prior assertion of institutional exemption from regulation. Il
164 As the court responded to the defendant's claims, Tauber's two chief arguments
formed the structure of the court's analysis. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
165 The most important aspect of these principles is the sole reliance on the words of the
statute when the intent of Congress is apparent on the face of the statute. When the intent is
clear, a court will not analyze legislative history. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
166 Tauber II, 8 F.3d 966, 976 (4th Cir. 1993). The court also addressed Tauber's argu-
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The Fourth Circuit determined that once the plain meaning of
the statute is determined from the face of the statute, no further analy-
sis is warranted. This strict interpretation of the words of Congress led
the court to reframe the issue when analyzing the legislative history' 67
and also to engage in a summary analysis of prior cases interpreting
the Treasury Amendment. 168 As a result, the court underemphasized
the interpretations of the Treasury Amendment from other authority
and relied principally upon its own interpretation of the statute.
The court's mechanical reading of the phrase "transactions in"
foreign currency without resort to outside authority also resulted in
the court's refusal to distinguish forwards, futures, and options. As a
regulatory matter, futures and options are much the same; both are
regulated on an equivalent basis by the CEA.169 However, forwards
differ greatly from futures and options in the regulatory framework.
Early in the case, the court sharply distinguished futures from for-
wards. Interpreting the Treasury Amendment, however, the court
lumped the two contracts together. The court's examples of the simi-
larities in the contracts is correct, but this analysis ignores the sharply
different treatment of the contracts under the CEA and defies the dis-
tinction between these contracts established in the CEA. The court's
strict reading clouds the regulatory distinction of these contracts and
shows a lack of appreciation of the importance of'the difference be-
tween futures and forwards.
In short, the court, in its step-by-step mechanical interpretation of
the statutory language, failed to consider the intricacies of the CEA
and the financial transactions it regulates. By omitting a critical analy-
sis of "transactions in" foreign currency, the Fourth Circuit glossed
over a critical issue in the case. As discussed below, the court's reliance
on its own interpretation guides its analysis of other authority. 170
2. The Legislative Histoiy: Who Is Exempt?
As discussed above, the court responded to Tauber's second argu-
ment by exploring the legislative history.' 71 As opposed to the Treas-
ury Letter, the court determined that the statute exempts individuals
as part of the interbank market.
ment that the legislative history of the Treasury Amendment showed that only forwards
should be exempt. According to the court, the Department of Treasury hoped to avoid
regulation of "foreign exchange futures trading, other than on organized exchanges." Id.
The court summarily concluded that the legislative history did not support Tauber's forwards
argument. Id.
167 See supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
170 See infra notes 171-80 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
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a. Misinterpretation of the Treasury Amendment's Purpose
The court's piecemeal construction of the Treasury Letter is logi-
cally consistent, but the analysis ignores the context of the Letter and
the Amendment. The main purpose of the Treasury Letter was to alert
Congress to the potential dual regulation of the banking industry by
bank regulators and the CFTC. Just as the court cited numerous
phrases referring to "traders and investors," the Letter abounds with
references to a network of institutions, not individuals. 172 Although
the Treasury Letter includes references to "dealers," and the identity
of these "dealers" is ambiguous, the Department of Treasury's concern
was clearly expressed in a single sentence: "Where the need for regula-
tion of transactions on other than organized exchanges does exist, this
should be done through strengthening existing regulatory responsibili-
ties now lodged in the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal
Reserve." 173 Avoiding this assertion, the court chose specific phrases
which cast doubt on whether an individual was a participant in the
interbank market. 174 Taken as a whole, the Treasury Letter addressed
the problem of CFTC encroachment upon bank regulators' jurisdic-
tion. Although numerous phrases may be read to include individuals
in the proposed exemption, such individuals could never be subject to
banking regulation. Bearing in mind the purpose of the Treasury Let-
ter, these individuals could not, reasonably be included in the exemp-
tion under the Treasury Amendment. The court, by selectively
reading the legislative history, missed the point of the exemption: the
prevention of dual regulation, not the exemption of a broad range of
traders.
b. The General Public and the Individual Trader
The court's analysis of the problem of mass-marketing to the gen-
eral public illustrates ambiguity in its broad exemption of over-the-
counter trades. After the court analyzed the legislative history and de-
cided that the statute exempts all over-the-counter trading,175 it quali-
fied its analysis by declaring that its holding does not apply to
transactions with the general public. The court's qualification reveals
duplicity, and consequent ambiguity, in its analysis. While the court
holds that the Treasury Amendment exempts all over-the-counter
trades, it declares that this conclusion cannot apply to small investors.
This analysis fails to clearly distinguish between regulation and exemp-
tion, and the holding carves out a category of traders in between clear
172 For example, the Treasury was concerned about regulation of"banks or other institu-
tions," Treasury Letter, supra note 13, at 5887, "sophisticated and informed institutions,"
"bank foreign currency departments," and "futures trading in foreign currencies by banks."
Id. at 5888.
173 Id. at 5888.
174 See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
175 Tauber II, 8 F.3d 966, 977 (4th Cir. 1993).
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exemption (institutions) and clear regulation (individual, small-time
investors). The analysis creates a fact-specific exempted category: the
"sophisticated trader."
3. Case Law: The Fourth Circuit Redefines the Issue
The court's interpretation of the Treasury Amendment guided its
interpretation of the case law. Under its scheme, all foreign currency
transactions and any participant in the interbank market are exempt.
However, as its analysis developed in light of other courts' holdings,
the Fourth Circuit shifted its analysis. The court distinguished "sophis-
ticated traders" from the general trading public.
First, the court addressed American Board of Trade, in which the
defendants operated a contract market without CFTC registration. 176
In light of the Second Circuit's holding, the court determined that
"the key factor for the Second Circuit in deciding the case was not the
subject matter of the deals-options and futures in foreign currency-
but the identity of the parties-unsophisticated private individuals
buying on an organized exchange." 177 Therefore, the court viewed the
fundamental issue as whether a member of the general public traded
in futures and options.
The court noticeably omitted analysis of the Second Circuit's dis-
cussion of "transactions in" foreign currency. In American Board of
Trade, the Second Circuit determined that an option on foreign cur-
rency could not be a "transaction in" the currency until the option was
exercised. Unlike the summary treatment of options by the Fourth
Circuit, the court in American Board of Trade scrutinized the meaning of
the phrase in light of the function of option contracts. In contrast, the
Fourth Circuit relied solely on its own interpretation of "transactions
in" foreign currency.
Second, the court briefly mentioned Board of Trade, where the Sev-
enth Circuit resolved a jurisdictional dispute between the SEC and the
CFTC.178 Here, the court summarily decided that off-exchange trad-
ing was not involved, so the case was inapplicable.
Like its discussion of American Board of Trade, the Fourth Circuit
ignored the Seventh Circuit's analysis of options. Consistent with Amer-
ican Board of Trade, the Seventh Circuit held that an option could not
be a "transaction in" the underlying commodity until the option was
exercised. Yet the Fourth Circuit omitted discussion of the ambiguity
surrounding "transactions in" foreign currency. 179
176 See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text.
177 Tauber 1, 8 F.3d at 977-78.
178 See supra notes 149-56 and accompanying text
179 One aspect of the Fourth Circuit's reasoning which contradicts the Seventh Circuit is
its construction of the "unless" clause of the Treasury Amendment. In contrast to the Fourth
Circuit's use of the "unless" clause as a modification of the exemption, the Seventh Circuit
considered this clause necessary to exempt futures or options when the contracts were per-
19941
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The Fourth Circuit's refraining of the issue is perplexing. The
case law construing the Treasury Amendment does not reach the issue
of off-exchange transactions among institutions, the analysis regarding
options trading under the Treasury Amendment illustrates genuine
ambiguity surrounding the phrase "transactions in" commodities. Yet
the Fourth Circuit completely omitted this aspect of the case law, rely-
ing instead on its own construction of the "unambiguous" phrase. To
buttress its interpretation, the court framed the issue as one of identity
of traders: whether the participants were members of the general pub-
lic or "sophisticated traders." Although consistent with its self-pro-
claimed standard of forgoing further inquiry once the statute is
interpreted on its face, 180 the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the Treasury
Amendment ignored the intricacies of the issue discussed in the case
law.
B. Policy Considerations after Tauber
1. The Regulatory Framework: The 'Tauber Test"?
The effect of this decision on the Federal regulatory framework is
difficult to predict, but the regulatory scheme which Tauber establishes
introduces ambiguity to federal commodities regulation. Under the
Tauber scheme, an individual or an institution which could be consid-
ered a "sophisticated trader" would be exempt because "individually-
negotiated foreign currency options and futures transactions between
sophisticated, large-scale foreign currency traders fall within the Treas-
ury Amendment's exclusion from CEA coverage."181
The Fourth Circuit's interpretive scheme establishes that: (1) the
Treasury Amendment is a broad exemption to the CEA, exempting all
trades; (2) the legislative history shows that the interbank market is
composed of large-scale sophisticated investors; (3) based on the facts
at the district court trial, anyone reasonably considered a "sophisticated
trader" is included in the interbank market; and (4) this construction
of the law cannot apply to the general public, as the CEA intends to
regulate such trading. Because an individual, ordinarily a member of
the general public, may trade over the counter if "sophisticated," the
salient issue under the Tauber scheme is the definition of a "sophisti-
cated trader."
The court summarily adopted the district court's determination
that Tauber was a sophisticated trader.18 2 Based on the facts of the
formed. Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1154 n.33. The Seventh Circuit, in this
footnote, implied that the Treasury Amendment's "unless" clause exempts only the "transac-
tions in" a commodity when the underlying spot asset is exchanged. The Fourth Circuit
failed to address this aspect of the Seventh Circuit's decision.
180 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
181 Tauber I, 8 F.3d. at 978.
182 Id. at 969. The procedural posture of the case prohibited a factual determination by
the court of appeals.
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case, this is a reasonable finding. However, this determination was the
key to finding that Tauber was included in the interbank market. As
mentioned above, 183 the court's holding exempts the interbank mar-
ket but does not apply to the general public. Therefore, Tauber com-
mands the courts to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether an
individual trader is sufficiently sophisticated to be included in the in-
terbank market. The scheme lacks a bright-line rule for regulation,
and the exemption issue must turn on the fact-specific inquiry of
whether an individual is a "sophisticated trader.' 84 Although courts
may borrow guideposts of who is sophisticated from other areas of the
law, 185 each case will be determined on its own facts.
The most troubling aspect of Tauber is that it pokes a hole in the
federal regulatory scheme. Under the Fourth Circuit's holding, an in-
dividual trader whose volume and skill in trading reaches a sufficient
level will achieve exemption from the CEA.186 Individuals are exempt
from federal banking regulations, and the subject matter of the trades
are beyond the federal securities laws.' 87 Therefore, individual traders
in this market could trade in foreign currency derivatives with no gov-
ernment oversight.18 8 According to the Tauber decision, these individ-
uals could even be exempt from the CEA anti-fraud provisions.' 89
The true effects of Tauber may be overestimated. The central trad-
ing center in the United States for interbank foreign currency trades is
New York, and the prospects of the Fourth Circuit becoming a base for
trading are slim. However, as legal precedent, the Tauber decision
could affect decisions among the circuits, as none have directly ad-
dressed this issue.190
183 See supra notes 76-79, 175 and accompanying text.
184 Exempting a "sophisticated trader" from CFTC rules resembles the securities regula-
tion exemption of "accredited investors." 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.506 (1993). An accred-
ited investor includes a person whose individual net worth (or joint net worth with spouse)
exceeds $1,000,000 or whose individual annual income exceeds $200,000 for the past two
years. If an individual qualifies as an accredited investor, the registration requirements of the
Securities Act do not apply. 17 U.S.C. § 77(d)(6) (1988). See also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE
LAw OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 4.20 (2d ed. 1990).
185 The most similar standard of sophistication is the exemption of accredited investors
under the securities laws. See supra note 184.
186 This is much more than a theoretical analysis. An example of a "sophisticated trader"
is George Soros, the Hungarian-born American trader. Last year, he reportedly cleared a $1
billion profit on speculation in the British Pound. He is also accused of upsetting the cur-
rency market in Europe. See Soros Adds to Pressure on European Exchange Rate System, L.A. TiMES,
July 31, 1993, at Dl.
187 See generally Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989) (deter-
mining CFTC and SEC jurisdiction regarding hybrid instruments).
188 Indeed, these individuals, as Tauber did, would probably trade with brokers and insti-
tutions already subject to federal regulations. However, according to Tauber I, federal law
currently does not directly regulate individuals trading for themselves in foreign currency
derivatives.
189 As the Treasury Amendment states: "Nothing in this act shall be deemed to govern ...
transactions in foreign currency." 7 U.S.C. § 2(ii) (Supp. IV 1992) (emphasis added).
190 The Tauber analysis and the interbank market as a whole, may be subject to legisla-
tion in the near future. In a report immediately following the Tauber I decision, the CFTC
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2. Tauber's Effect on the Foreign Exchange Market
The effect of Tauber on the foreign exchange market is virtually
unpredictable. However, the court's decision will exempt a portion of
the market and may promote trading in the United States.
The most basic application of Tauber is the addition of more trad-
ers to the interbank market. The court's definition of a "sophisticated
trader" defies precise definition. But as a general principal, the fact-
specific test that the case establishes will exempt more market partici-
pants from CFTC regulation. If more traders are included in the defi-
nition of a "sophisticated trader," the foreign exchange market should
expand.
Secondly, the foreign currency exchange market presents special
regulatory questions because, unlike domestic commodities, foreign
exchange trading can move overseas to jurisdictions which impose less
stringent regulations. Wherever regulations are most favorable to for-
eign currency trading, international traders will most likely choose thatjurisdiction in which to trade.'19 If Tauber deeply affects the American
regulatory scheme, more foreign currency traders will move to the
United States to enjoy the lighter regulations.
Third, under the Tauberscheme, certain individual traders will en-
joy trading, with no federal oversight. These "sophisticated traders"
can significantly affect the market. One example is George Soros, 192
who reaped trading profits of $650 million in 1993 and was suspected
of single-handedly upsetting the exchange rate of the British pound.
His conduct prompted one U.S. Congressman to ask the SEC to in-
quire into the possibility of a single trader adversely affecting foreign
exchange rates. 193 From a fact-specific inquiry, Soros is certainly a "so-
phisticated trader." Ultimately, participants in the foreign exchange
expressed concern about the clarity of the analysis. COMMODrY FUTURES TRADING COMMIS-
SION, supra note 41, at 156. The Commission emphasized that the Treasury Amendment
should in no way exempt futures and options offered to the general public. Accordingly,
"the Commission will consider recommending to Congress legislation that would affirm the
CFTC's view that the Treasury Amendment does not extend to the sale of futures or options
in foreign currencies to the general public." Id. The Commission has also explored coordi-
nation of the regulatory systems which oversee derivatives, futures, and securities. Although
the CFTC approves of the current multi-agency effort (the CFTC, the SEC, and the bank
regulators), it advocates an interagency coordinating council. Id. at 157-74.
The idea of an interagency commission is supported by Rep. Jim Leach (R- Iowa) in his
recent proposal to regulate the derivatives industry. In October, Leach presented a report
prepared by the House Committee on Banking and Finance. COMMrrrEE ON BANKING, Fi-
NANCE, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS IssuEs RELATED TO BANK DERIVATIVES Ac-
TrrIvEs (October 1993). In this report, the Committee suggests a number of coordinating
measures between the banking, securities, and commodities regulators that would assure in-
teragency cooperation in regulating the derivatives industry. Id. at 5.
191 A chief argument for the amici curiae arguing for Salomon was the potential for trad-
ers to take their business off-shore, thereby adversely affecting the trading market in the
United States.
192 See supra note 186.
19' Mathews, supra note 1.
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market who operate without regulation may harm the entire
industry.19 4
These conclusions are based on the assumption that Tauber will
significantly affect the foreign exchange market, and currently there is
no firm indication that such a result is imminent. However, by creat-
ing the "sophisticated trader" exemption, the Fourth Circuit obscured
the standards of commodity futures regulation and presented an op-
portunity for large-scale, individual traders to trade without regulation.
VI. Conclusion
The Fourth Circuit's holding hinged upon a strict, mechanical
analysis of the words of the Treasury Amendment. This analysis
guided the court's construction of the legislative history of the amend-
ment and the case law which had interpreted it. Once the court dis-
cerned the intent of Congress from the words of the statute, further
analysis was inconsequential.
This rigid analysis overlooked the intricacies of the issue and pro-
duced a result at odds with the current regulatory scheme. The Fourth
Circuit established that the Treasury Amendment exempts all transac-
tions in foreign currency when traded over the counter, but the ex-
emption could not apply to the general public. The result is a fact-
specific category of sophisticated traders who are exempt from the
CEA. By introducing the ambiguity of case-by-case exemptions under
the Treasury Amendment, the Fourth Circuit rejected bright-line regu-
latory rules, opened the foreign currency market to unregulated trad-
ers, and clouded the standards of commodity 'futures regulation.
CAMDEN R. WEBB
194 The most prominent counter-argument to protecting the market against traders re-
flects the securities regulation theme of protecting only those investors who need protection
of the federal law. See supra note 184. Sophisticated traders such as Soros need no protection
because they are fully capable of anticipating risks in trading. This argument is founded on
the belief that the commodity regulations should protect investors individually rather than as
a group or the market as a whole.
Currently, government officials are split as to the treatment of these traders. See supra
note 190. Some members of Congress favor stronger market controls to limit market fluctua-
tion, see supra note 190 and accompanying text, but the CFTC does not share such a restric-
tive view of such traders. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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